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ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN FRANCE, GERMANY,
AND SWITZERLAND:
A SURVEY OF A RECENT CHAPTER
IN LEGAL DOCTRINE
Vera Bolgdr*
FRANCE
In the development and the clarification of the doctrine of
the abuse of rights French scholarship occupies the key posi-
tion. It was through the writings of the most authoritative
protagonist of the doctrine, Louis Josserand,' that the prob-
lems attending the consequences of any abusive exercise of
rights were given renewed attention and exerted consider-
able influence on contemporary doctrine as well as on the
jurisprudence of the courts.
The basic principle seems simple and irrefutable. It pro-
vides that whoever abuses his legal rights should be held
liable for the consequences of such abuse. Nevertheless, the
reactions to this principle gave rise to a controversy that
went beyond the simple causes and effects of the abuse of
rights and eventually came to touch upon the then prevalent
notions on the nature and the functions of law. Perhaps it
was not by chance that the controversy arose and reached its
most violent forms in France, in the country where any re-
striction on individual freedom of action or on the intangibil-
* Research Associate in Comparative Law, University of Michigan School
of Law; Visiting Professor, University of Toledo, College of Law; Former Sec-
retary, American Journal of Comparative Law.
1. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (1st ed. 1905); L. JOSSERAND, DE
L'ESPRrr DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVIT19: THItORIE DITE DE L'ABUS DES
DROITS (lst ed. 1927); L. Josserand, kvolutions et actualits in CONFItRENCES DE
DROIT CIVIL (1936); L. Josserand,A propos de la relativit des droits, 1929 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE IGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE [REV. CRIT. L!EG. ET JURISPR.]
277; 2 L. JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRAN(CAIS no. 428 (3d
ed. 1938).
Abbreviations for French reports are the following: Cass. civ.: Chambre
civile de la Cour de Cassation; Cass. comm.: Chambre commerciale de la Cour de
Cassation; Cass. req.: Chambre des requites de la Cour de Cassation; D.: Dalloz,
Recueil pbriodique et critique de jurisprudence, de lgislation et de doctrine;
D.H.: Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurisprudence; D.-P.: Dalloz, Recueil
p~riodique et critique de jurisprudence, de legislation et de doctrine; D.-S.:
Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, de doctrine, de jurisprudence et de lgislation; Gaz.-Pal.:
Gazette du Palais.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ity of individual'rights was considered a violation of the rev-
olutionary mystique of liberty2 as embodied in the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and the Code Napoleon. Or was it
altogether by chance that the abusive exercise of rights, as it
were their d~tournement, by private individuals came into the
focus of interest through the parallel scrutiny of the French
Conseil d'Etat into the d~tournement de pouvoir as exercised
by the public authorities? 3
It should also be recalled that the appearance of Jos-
serand's theories, at the turn of the nineteenth century
marked one of the most radical, changes: in the ideas on the
nature and the functions of law, and the effects of this change
were reflected in the ensuing. controversies. Briefly, what
Josserand voiced was the vindication of the gradual process
that shifted the importance of individual rights from their
private, autonomous domain into thesocial field, and trans-
formed the exercise of these very rights into social functions.4
Hence the controversy on the abuse of rights turned around
the old and the new: represented by those who held-that
there. can be no abuse of rights if they were exercised within
the limits of the law that granted these rights--le droit cesse
oit lVabus commence 5.- and by those who held that any exer-
2. R. SAVATIER, DU DROIT CIVIL AU DROIT PUBLIC 7 (1945).
3. The similarity between the d~tournement de pouvoir within individual
rights and within the functions of public officials is, however, merely one of
surface. In checking whether a public authority has exceeded the limits of its
power as set down by law the administrative courts merely examine whether
such action conformed to the public interest that, in its turn, sets the limits of
such power. The examination is altogether objective and has nothing to do with
morals or equity, which, on the other hand, are the determining factors in
qualifying individual actions as abusive of rights. Cf. 1 R. DAVID, LE DROIT
FRANQAIS: LES DONNtES FONDAMENTALES 179 (1960); English translation in R.
DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 201 (M.
Kindred transl. 1972) [hereinafter cited as David]. 1 R. SAVATIER, TRAITP, DE LA
RESPONSABILITIt CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN(AIS 53 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as
SAVATIER]; Conseil d'htat, Judgment of February 27, 1903, S.1905:3.17, note
Hauriou. On an exhaustive treatment of the jurisprudence of the Conseil
d'ktat, in particular under the abuse of rights theory, see LOUIS DUBOUIS, LA
THkORIE DE L'ABUS DE DROIT ET LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE (1962),
especially with a view to d~tournement de pou)'oir at 184 ff.
4. Next to Josserand the most famous exponent of this view was Lbon
Duguit. See L. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GtNtRALES DU DROIT PRIVA
DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLON (lst ed. 1912). See also DAVID at 179.
5. "The law stops where abuse begins." This is a famous quotation taken
from 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITP ,LtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 871 (11th ed. 1939).
See also his note at D.1902.2.329; cf. 1 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC,
TRAIT THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE, Dk-
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cise of rights which is contrary to the social functions of these
rights constitutes abuse.6 The chief protagonist of the first
theory, besides Planiol, was Georges Ripert, who feared that
the emphasis on the social as against the individual orienta-
tion of law will gradually deprive the individual of his subjec-
tive rights. For the first school, abuse of rights involved ac-
tions which, even though exercised within the limits of the
law, are contrary to morals; but carrying this thought further
it also held that the judicial scrutiny of the morality of indi-
vidual actions would introduce an arbitrary element into the
jurisprudence of the courts. 7
In essence, this is the same theory that governed the
highly individualistic system of Roman law. Under its guiding
principles no action exercised within the limits of a legally
stated right could be construed as abuse;8 nevertheless, this
principle was tempered in time by the exceptio doli generalis
and specialis, under which the defendant could allege plain-
tiffs fraud, on the one hand, and by the possibly first formu-
lation of a theory on the abuse of rights, under which Gaius
enjoined the mistreatment of slaves and upheld the functions
of spendthrift guardians, on the other: male enim nostro iure
uti non debemus 9-we should not exercise our rights wrong-
fully.
On the other hand, Dean Ripert's statement that the
interest in the doctrine of abuse of rights emerged concur-
rently with the renewed interest in civil liability and, in par-
ticular, with the extension of its field of application,'0 was
justified by later developments. Planiol's views were upheld
with respect to certain rights within which individual au-
tonomy remained either absolute or discretionary;" but
LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 627 (5th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as
MAZEAUD ET TUNc].
6. See text at note 4, supra.
7. G. RIPERT, LA RhGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 195 (3d ed.
1935) [hereinafter cited as RIPERT]; Ripert,Abus ou relativit des droits, 49 REV.
CRIT. LPG. ET JURISPR. 33, 57 (1929).
8. DIGEST 50.17.55 (Ulpian): nullus videtur dolofacere qui auo iure utitur;
also D.50.155.1 (Paulus): non videtur vim facere qui iure suo utitur.
9. GAIUS INST. 1.53; cf. G. CORNIL, LE DROIT PRIVt 102; MAZEAUD ET TUNC
at 629.
10. RiPERT at 169; Appleton, Notre ensiegnment du droit romain: ses en-
nemis et sea dfauts, in MtLANGES DE DROIT ROMAIN DtDItS X GEORGES CORNIL
43, 73 (1926).
11. Rouast, Les droits discr~tionnaires et les droits contr6l6s, 42 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.] 1 (1944). 2 G. RIPERT ET J.
BOULANGER, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL D'APR9S LE TRAITIt DE PLANIOL (1957)
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beyond this restricted category, Josserand's theory on the
relativity of rights became the widely accepted view, under
which the relativity of rights was equated with their socially
equitable exercise.12 It was at this point that contact was
made between the theories of abuse of rights and civil liabil-
ity; the determining factor in both fields became the motive of
fault that induced a particular individual action, and as a
further step, entailed the reparation of damages which arise
through such fault. It made no difference whether the dam-
age was caused through actions involving the abuse of rights
or through actions involving negligence or delict. 13
These ideas were equally reflected in French legislation.
It should be mentioned at this point that one of the most
representative rights of individual autonomy, the right of
ownership, was already given its limitations at the time of its
original formulation,' 4 since the legislator stated as early as
1804 that the owner's absolute rights are limited by law.
In the following years, provisions were codified which
established the requirement of good faith in the dissolution of
partnerships, 5 providing also for the restitution of damages
arising either through the unilateral rescission of contracts's
or through the "abusive termination of a labor contract"; 7
in the latter case, the law imposed on the courts the determi-
nation of the abuse.' 8
Further provisions impose limitations on the owner's right
with respect to leasing his property for private habitation, 9
[hereinafter cited as RIPERT ET BOULANGER] at 368 lists the following rights
which are not susceptible of abuse, i.e., they are discretionary: the parents'
right to consent or to oppose the marriage of their children, the paternal rights
over the children, the right of testation, the rights of ownership (for its reser-
vations, however, see note 14 infra) as well as the right not to enter into
contracts. On the judicial approval of this last right, see Ppernay, February 28,
1906, and Lille, November 12, 1906, D.1908.2.73, note Josserand; Aix, December
21, 1910, D.1911.2.385, note Planiol.
12. SAVATIER at 51.
13. MAZEAUD ET TUNc at 624, 633.
14. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 544: Ownership is the right to enjoy and to
dispose of things (choses) in the most absolute manner, provided they are not
used in a manner as prohibited by law or by regulations (translation by author);
cf. RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 366.
15. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 1869-70.
16. Law of December 17, 1890 amending FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1780.
17. LABOR CODE Bk. I, art. 23 as modified by Law of July 19, 1928.
18. Art. 6(2) of Law of November 16, 1942; cf., CASS. civ., December 15, 1936,
Gaz. Pal. 1937.1.177; Paris, June 7,1937, Gaz. Pal. 1937.2.404; MAZEAUD ET TUNC
at 631.
19. Art. 21 of Law of September 1, 1948 (D.1949.93) which penalizes the
1018 [Vol. 35
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for commercial use,20 or for farming21-in these instances
equally imposing on the courts the examination whether this
right was exercised abusively, i.e., with the intent to harm.22
The Code of Civil Procedure lays down limitations on the right
to bring actions by imposing a fine on the dilatory or abusive
exercise of this right.23
An instructive illustration of the legislator's acceptance
of the theory that law should be considered in its social-
functional aspects was given by the 1965 reforms of the laws
relating to marriage and marital property. For instance, arti-
cle 223 of the Code Civil that recognized the husband's right
of refusal to the wife's exercise of a profession, unless this
right is abused, 24 was radically changed in its new reformed
version. 25
However, in the development of the doctrine of the abuse
of rights it was not the legislator but the courts who played
the decisive part. At first they elaborated the original limita-
tions on ownership, and interpreted as an abusive exercise of
ownership rights such exercise as was motivated by the in-
tent to cause harm,26 or when the damages which arose from
owner who refuses to lease his house to a family with many children; here the
abuse of the right not to contract is the reason for the penalty; cf. MAZEAUD ET
TUNC at 632. 1
20. Art. 19 of Decree of September 30, 1953 (D.1954.185).
21. Code Rural art. 846, modified by Law of September 5, 1947; for pres-
ent legislation, see MAZEAUD ET TUNC at 632, 637.
22. MAZEAUD ET TUNC at 637.
23. FRENCH CODE PRO. Civ. arts. 453, 471. Under these articles there is a
jurisprudence constante; cf. CASS. CIV., March 9, 1949, Gaz. Pal. 1949.1.245;
CASS. CIV., February 22, 1950, S. 1950.1.183; Lyon, January 31, 1951,
D.H.1951.258. For further decisions, see RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 366-67;
SAVATIER at 83.
24. Paris, December 7, 1940. Gaz. Pal. 1941.1.11; cf. MAZEAUD ET TUNC at
632.
25. FRENCH CIV. CODE (new) art. 223: "The wife has the right to exercise a
profession without the consent of the husband, and she may at all times, for the
requirements of this profession, alienate or enter into obligations on her own
with respect to her own property" (translation by author).
26. The French courts apply different principles to controversies arising
from this particular right than do the English courts who would qualify these
cases as falling within the law of nuisance. AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUC-
TION TO FRENCH LAw 219 (3d ed. F. H. Lawson, A. E. Anton & L. Neville Brown
1967); RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 366. See also cases in notes 38, 39, infra; also
Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.1856.2.199 involving an owner who reduced the
neighbor's spring waters by diverting them through his own land. For a similar
case in the Common Law, see The Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C.587
(H.L.) discussed by Albert Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34
LA. L. REV. 993, 995.
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such exercise were far in excess of the advantages gained by
the owner.27
The parallels in the development of the doctrines of the
abuse of rights and civil liability are particularly evident in
the jurisprudence of the courts; indeed, their implementation
is the exclusive work of jurisprudence, strikingly similar to the
developments in the Common Law. The French courts have
built the standing practice on the abuse of rights-in the ab-
sence of a general legislative rule-upon a few scattered provi-
sions and their successive amendments under the guiding prin-
ciple that the damages caused through the abusive exercise of
rights, which they qualified as "fault," should be repaired by
the party who abused his rights. As regards the doctrine of civil
liability, the courts had not much more to go on. In Book III,
title IV, chapter II of the Code Civil, on "delicts and quasi-
delicts," three terse provisions provide for the reparation of
damages caused either directly or vicariously by the party at
fault, and these three provisions were the foundations of the
entire system of modern legal principles that constitute the
French law of civil liability.28
In the determination of the presence or the absence of
abuse of rights in given fact situations, however, the courts
operate in a narrower field than the one governed by civil
liability. The central feature of both fields is the restitution of
damages caused by the party at fault: under the rules of civil
liability, the courts inquire whether it was caused through
imprudence, negligence or a quasi-delictual behavior-in
other words, whether the action violated not merely the rules
of law but also the rules of equity; 29 whereas under the ac-
cepted doctrine of the abuse of rights, the fault which caused
the damage may only arise within the limits of those rights
which by their nature may allow a certain causation of
27. The courts follow the formulation of the Court of Cassation, CAss. CIV.,
February 18, 1907, D.1907.1.385, 387, note Ripert: "attendu qu'un industriel qui,
par l'exploitation de son usine, cause aux voisins un prejudice, excdant la
mesure des obligations ordinaires du voisinage, est en faute s'il n~glige lea
precautions qu'il y aurait lieu de prendre pour pr~venir ces inconv nients." For
the legislative and jurisprudential elaboration of such animus nocendi or fault
in the French-inspired law of Quebec, see Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France
and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993, 995.
28. A glance of the large amount of case-law printed under articles 1382,
1383 in the pocket edition of the CODE CML (Dalloz, Petits Codes, 1971-72)
illustrates this body of law; see also MAZEAUD ET TUNc at 633, 646.
29. SAVATIER at 50.
1020 [Vol. 35
ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN EUROPE
harm.30 Consequently, abuse of rights may only arise in con-
nection with damages caused through the exercise of these
particular rights; in the examination of damages caused by
other means the question of the abuse of rights does not
concern the courts.3 1 Among the rights within which "there
exists a codified permission to do harm,"32 are those, for in-
stance, which govern ownership,33 contracts, 34 business com-
petition;3 5 such are also the procedural rights which au-
thorize the initiation of actions or their appeal.3 6 In deciding
situations involving these particular rights the courts merely
examine whether these were exercised within the legally au-
thorized limits of their purpose or whether they were abused,
on the one hand, or whether they were exercised for the
exclusive purpose of causing harm, on the other.
It might be of interest to cite a few decisions in detail
which illustrate the position of the courts with respect to
these principles. One of the earliest decisions was handed
down by the Court of Colmar,37 in which the court stated that
the limits of the right of ownership are set by a serious and
legitimate interest, and therefore they do not authorize mis-
chievous actions (in the case, the erection of a chimney) which
are not justified by reasons of utility and are destined to
damage the interests of third parties.
In the Affaire Clement-Bayard38 the Court of Cassation
:had no difficulty in finding abuse of the right of property
since the owner of a field adjacent to the hangar for zeppelins
used by Messrs. Clement-Bayard erected a wooden structure
topped with metal spikes for the purpose of impeding the
operations of the zeppelins. Similarly within the field of
ownership, the Court of Cassation upheld the liability of the
owners and awarded damages which arose through their use
of electrical machinery on the grounds that "even the legiti-
mate exercise of the rights of ownership will generate liabil-
30. Id. at 51-52.
31. MAZEAUD ET TUNC at 626.
32. SAVATIER at 51.
33. See notes 26, 27 supra.
34. CASS. cIv., May 7, 1902, Gaz. Pal. June 1902; CASS. CIV., May 4,1942, Gaz.
Pal. August 15-18, 1942; Seine, December 16, 1919, D.1920.2.33, note Ripert; cf.
RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 368.
35. RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 367; SAVATIER at 64.
36. See note 23 supra.
37. Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.1856.2.9.
38. CASS. REQ., August 3, 1915, S.1920.1.300, D.P.1917.1.79.
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ity if the resulting inconvenience to third parties goes beyond
the ordinary obligations towards neighbors."3 9
In controversies affecting shareholders' rights, the Court
of Cassation adopts a restrictive interpretation to alleged
abuses of rights and tends to uphold the validity of decisions
voted upon either by the board of directors or by the general
assembly. For example, by reversing a decision of the Court
of Appeal the Court saw no abuse of rights in a measure
voted upon by the board of directors of a company by which
transfers of shares were subjected to the agreement of the
board.40 The Court held that this measure did not abuse the
provisions of the controlling law since these touch merely on
the shareholders' freedom to vote but not on their freedom of
acquisition. Similarly, the Court upheld the validity of a deci-
sion brought by the general assembly of a limited liability
company 4 that settled the remuneration of the managers
and denied recourse to the courts for contesting the decision.
In the opinion of the Court, unless there is evidence of action
that is either violative of procedure or abusive of sharehold-
ers' rights, the courts may not substitute their decisions for
those of the general assembly.
Finally, a decision of the Court of Appeal of Ghent should
be noted since it is an excellent illustration of the judicial
implementation of the abuse of rights doctrine. 42 The con-
troversy arose under the rights of eminent domain of the
township of Courtrai. The town started construction of public
roads which ran through private lands without the prelimi-
nary measures of expropriation. The Court rejected the re-
quest of appellants, the owners of the land, for the restitution
of the fences and for the demolition of the constructions
erected by the town, on the grounds that even though Cour-
trai committed an abuse of its rights of eminent domain, the
39. CASS. civ., May 29, 1937, S.1937.1.244, D.H.1937.393, also in H. CAPI-
TANT, LES GRANDS ARR]PTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE 380 (6th ed. 1973).
40. CASS. CIV., October 22, 1956, D.1957.J.177, note Ripert.
41. CASS. COMM., January 11, 1972, D.S.1972.1.559, note Orengo. The
decision treats a problem that has not as yet been explicitly decided by the
courts. For a similar case see Douai, February 11, 1972, D.S.1972.J.279.
42. Even though this case was decided by a Belgian court, it is mentioned
here since the Belgian law is also governed by the Code Napolbon (with sub-
sequent Belgian modifications). In addition, the discussion of the decision is one
of the most frequently cited publications on the French principles of abuse of
rights; cf. Ghent, November 20, 1950, 7 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
BELGE 270 (1953) with note by A. De Bersaques, "L'abus de droit," at 272.
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damages which the town would incur through the imposition
of specific performance would exceed by far the harm done
through its violation of appellants' rights of ownership.
In the continuing jurisprudence of the French courts,
their final achievement in the implementation of the abuse of
rights doctrine was the segregation of that particular kind of
fault that was committed through the abusive exercise of a
right. Even though the bases for awarding the damages
which arise through the abuse remain similar to those
applied in the field of civil liability for damages which arise
through fault, nevertheless, "by baptizing this particular
fault as abuse," the courts have proved that even within the
exercise of a right there may exist the motive of fault. If their
jurisprudence had not added anything new to the Code in this
respect, it has nevertheless revealed the wealth of its sub-
stance.43
GERMANY
The developments in Germany with respect to the doc-
trine of abuse of rights were all in all similar to the develop-
ments in France. However, it should be recalled that the
German Civil Code was promulgated roughly one century
later than the French Code Civil;" hence the progress of
ideas within this span of time, from the strictly individualistic
towards the social-functional aspects of law-which affected
legal thought in Germany as well-had its definite impact on
the principles that lay at the foundations of the German code.
In particular, there was less resistance towards embodying in
the code a provision that reflects the acceptance of a doctrine
under which the unrestricted exercise of individual rights
may be limited, if such exercise means the abuse of these
very rights. Nevertheless, the then still prevailing ideas of
liberalism were evident in the drafting stages of the code,
since the Senate expressed criticism towards the inclusion of
43. MAZEAUD ET TUNc at 646.
44. The German BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (B.G.B.) was promulgated in
1896 and came into force on January 1, 1900-the first product of the law of the
XXth century.
Abbreviations for German reports are the following: BGHZ: Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (reports of decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court (civil matters); RG, RGZ: Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (reports of decisions of the civil divisions of the
former German Supreme Court).
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a provision that would restrict the exercise of individual
rights on grounds of fraud.4 5 The reasoning of the Senate was
in essence similar to the French reasons put forth against the
doctrine of abuse of rights,46 namely, that the judicial deter-
mination of fraud would obscure the limits between the rules
of objective positive law and the rules of subjective morals. 47
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the French Commis-
sion de Revision du Code Civil, which rejected the inclusion of
an article on abuse of rights in the preliminary sections of the
Code, 48 the German drafters inserted into the Code an article
on the abuse of rights, which provides for the unequivocal
refusal to recognize any exercise of rights that was carried
out for the only purpose to cause harm.49
In addition to this explicit, positive provision, two further
articles of the code indirectly affect the doctrine of the abuse
of rights: article 242, that lays down the general provision on
good faith-Treu und Glauben-in the execution of obliga-
tions, and article 826 that provides for the restitution of dam-
ages caused by actions that are contra bonos mores.50
The legislative history of the right of ownership, consid-
ered by liberal philosophy as the practically unrestricted
power in the exercise of individual rights, illustrates in the
German example the gradual shifting of importance from the
private-individual to the social domain. In the first draft, the
formulation of the rights of ownership was close to the
French idea of fixing these as the rights of disposal in the
mani~re la plus absolue;51 in the final version, which became
the codified provision, the manner of the exercise of these
45. This provision would have incorporated the Roman principle of the
exceptio doli, under which defendant could claim that plaintiff acted fraudu-
lently. For German law, see L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, LEHRBUCH
DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 1440 (Halbband/II, 5th ed.
Nipperdey 1960) [hereinafter cited as ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF];
STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERUCHEN GESETZBUCH, RECHT DER
SCHULDVERHALTNISSE § 242 at 743 (11th ed. 1961).
46. Cf. RIPERT at 195.
47. Id. at 178.
48. The suggestion for inclusion came from Raymond Saleilles. Cf. RIPERT
at 169.
49. BGB art. 226.
50. Cf. ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF at 1443; T. SOERGEL & W. SIE-
BERT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 242, Note III [here-
inafter cited as SOERGEL-SIEBERT].
51. The German wording in the first draft was "nach Willkuir," arbitrarily,
with full authority; cf. 0. PALANDT, BiURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 993 (12th ed.
1954) [hereinafter cited as PALANDT].
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rights was set down "at discretion. ' 52 Moreover, while the
French restrictions on ownership are limited by the code to
existing laws and regulations, the German code adds to these
restrictions the rights of third parties. This idea was already
present in the Weimar Constitution, promulgated in 1919,
which proclaimed the obligatory nature of ownership as well
as its exercise for the public interest.53 The post-World War II
Constitution, the Bonn Basic Law, repeats this idea, but adds
renewed emphasis to the social functions of ownership by
declaring that its exercise should serve equally for the benefit
of the community.54
These legislative developments, however, were already
anticipated by the German courts: as early as 1902, the
Supreme Court declared that the strict principles of owner-
ship, which were taken from Roman law, were already alien
to contemporary legar ideas;55 also in establishing the obliga-
tion for the security of transfers of ownership, the court
stated that ownership creates not merely rights but also obli-
gations.56
On the other hand, the law sets restrictions equally on
the obligations which arise in connection with the rights of
ownership. Thus, various articles of the Civil Code regulate
the owner's obligations so far as toleration of nuisance is
concerned, and list in detail the kinds of such nuisances:
emission of gaseous substances, of odors, smoke, soot, heat,
noise, shocks, etc. These may be tolerated only to the extent
that does not impair the regular use of the property; con-
trariwise, the owner is entitled to ask for injunction or, in
case such nuisance is the consequence of unavoidable
economic activities, to ask for damages. 57
A further protection for the owner is the presumption of
his freedom over the disposal and use of his property; this has
the important procedural consequence that the burden of
proof is shifted to the party who requests the limitations of
the owner's rights. 58
52. "nach Belieben"; cf. BGB art. 903.
53. Article 153.111 of Weimar Constitution.
54. Article 14.11 of Bonner Grundgesetz; cf. PALANDT, note to § 903 at 966.
55. 52 RG 376 (1902).
56. 89 RG 121 (1916); cf. PALANDT at 966.
57. BGB art. 906.
58. 3 L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, SACHENRECHT 174-75; (10th ed. by Martin Wolff-Ludwig
Raiser 1957). See also SOERGEL-SIEBERT § 226 at 988 n.26.
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With respect to the development of the doctrine of the
abuse of rights, eventually two theories gained ground, called
the "external" and the "internal" theories.59 The first shows
some similarities to those French views that stress the exer-
cise of rights as against the nature of the right, and maintain
that there can be no abuse of rights only an abuse of their
exercise if this is contrary to morals.60 In line with this reason-
ing, the German "external" abuse of rights theory holds that all
restrictions are uniquely directed against the owners of the
rights and affect merely the exercise of rights and leave the
nature of the right intact; as it were, they affect the right only
externally.61 The "internal" theory, on the other hand, insists
that the right itself, its immanent nature, controls its very
exercise. 62 It was this latter theory that was taken over by the
governing doctrine 63 and was influential in the implementation
by the courts of the various features of abuse.6 4
In essence, in the elaboration of the doctrine of abuse of
rights, the German courts did not have many more codified
provisions available for assistance than were available to the
French courts. In addition to article 226 which is fairly re-
strictive in scope (limiting the purpose to cause harm, i.e.,
only to malicious action), there are two broad general provi-
sions in the Code which stipulate the requirement of good
faith and the conformity with bonos mores in the exercise of
rights. Since these provisions offer no more than general
guidelines, the courts had to interpret the incidence of abuse
59. W. SIEBERT, VERWIRKUNG UND UNZULAISSIGKEIT DER RECHTS-
AUSOBUNG 83 et seq. (1934) [hereinafter cited as SIEBERT].
60. See text at notes 5-7, supra.
61. In the German wording, this process is the idussere Rechtsbeschrdn-
kung, which implements the Aussentheorie; SIEBERT at 83; ENNECCERUS,
KIPP, AND WOLFF at 1442 n.23.
62. In the German wording, Innentheorie; cf. SIEBERT at 85; ENNEC-
CERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF at 1442.
63. The fundamental idea that the exercise of each and every right is
limited as a matter of course by the content of these rights has already been
formulated by Otto v. Gierke, 1 DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 319 (1895). Gierke's
admirable elaboration of the social functions of law that sets at the same
time the limits of its abuse, whether the abuse occurs through the use, the
misuse, or the non-use of a right, is a forerunner of all the later Western
theories.
64. See the leading opinion handed down by the German Federal Supreme
Court in the judgment of July 12, 1951, 3 BGHZ 94, 103 (1951) in which the court
rejected the defense that the incriminated action was carried out under the
provisions of a statute on the grounds that any implementation of a statute that
is contrary to its nature and original purpose qualifies as abuse of rights. Cf.
also Judgment of January 27, 1954, 12 BGHZ 157 (1954).
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in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each particu-
lar case; this meant that they had to examine whether the
contested exercise of a right was truly malicious and as such
constituted an abuse of rights or whether, even though not
malicious, it was nevertheless violating the general require-
ments of good faith or morals.
While judicial interpretation had to move within the
broad limits of these general rules, nevertheless certain typi-
cal situations emerged in the course of time which, in turn,
served as the bases for certain typical rules. These rules may
be summarized as follows:
(a) all exercise of rights is abusive if grossly inequitable
under the circumstances, or is carried out with no regard for
the legitimate interests of other parties;6 5
(b) no exercise of rights will be given legal recognition if
these rights were acquired either through the violation of
laws or in bad faith;6 6
(c) no exercise of rights will be given legal recognition if
it is contrary to former conduct;67 and finally,
65. 150 RGZ 286 (1936) (cancellation of a lease on the last day of its
termination); Judgment of February 19, 1951, 1 BGHZ 186 (1951) (use of
formal advantages given by law without substantive justifications); Judg-
ment of February 21, 1952, 5 BGHZ 186 (1952) (petition for divorce based on
the malicious deception of the wife considered abuse of rights if held forth by
petitioner for the only purpose to have the marriage dissolved in order to
marry another woman). Cf. ENNECCERUS, KiPp AND WOLFF at 1444, n.32; App.
Celle, Judgment of July 7, 1950, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 317
(1951).
66. Judgment of October 6, 1953, 10 BGHZ 319 (1953) (abusive exercise of
banking rights if bank's defense is the knowledge of client of a reservation
for the transfer of funds during exceptional circumstances); Judgment of
February 24, 1954, 12 BGHZ 328 (1954) (it violates the rules of good faith if
plaintiff requests continued high payments from company which were
awarded to him during the National Socialist period); Judgment of March 31,
1954, 13 BGHZ 67 (1954) (the German Federal Railways, which as a legal
entity are identical with the former German Reich Railways, may not avail
themselves of their rights of redemption against land bought second-hand
from a Jewish owner in 1942); Judgment of May 29, 1954, id. at 346 (a decision
in which the Court examines under the guidelines of good faith whether the
request for a pension of a former corporation executive under the National
Socialist regime would be justified had employment contract been signed
under normal circumstances). Cf. ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF at 1444.
n.33.
67. Judgment of January 28, 1938, 67 JURIsTIsCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 860
(1938), even though contract for services provided for rescission at will, the
circumstances of a given case might prevent the validity of such rescission
(elaboration of the venire contrafactum proprium rule); cf. ENNECCERUS, Kipp
AND WOLFF at 1444, n.36.
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(d) all exercise of rights is illegal if carried out mali-
ciously for the only purpose to cause harm.68
The last one of these rules is closest to the principle
enunciated in article 226, the codified provision on the abuse
of rights. It is also the one that affects the exercise of rights
which lie outside the scope of the Civil Code, for instance,
rights which govern family relations, successions, or even
commercial transactions or business competition. 9
Under the German doctrine of the abuse of rights, simi-
larly to French doctrine, the nature of abuse is conditioned by
the nature of those rights in which there is a codified permis-
sion to do harm, as for instance, in the rights of business
competition or industrial property. However, if the exercise of
these rights goes beyond the codified permission, or is exclu-
sively motivated by malice, it will qualify as abuse of rights.
However, because of such close interaction between legally
permitted abuse and malicious abuse, the judicial determina-
tion of abuse of rights is a complicated process in which the
court examines the facts and circumstances of the case and,
in addition, also the intent of the parties. 69 a The burden of proof
is on the party who alleges the malicious intent. On the other
hand, the courts give relief even in the absence of malicious
intent if the exercise of a right violates the good faith and good
68. This is the principle laid down in BGB art. 226, under the title, the
prohibition of chicane, the abuse of rights. It was not included, without any
discussion, in the Civil Code; indeed, in the first draft it was destined merely as a
protective provision for the rights of ownership until incorporated eventually
as one of the general provisions. (Cf. text at notes 48 and 51). The leading
decision on chicane was handed down by the Supreme Court in the Judgment of
December 3, 1909,72 RGZ 251(1910), that qualified as gross abuse ofthe rights of
ownership a father's prohibition to his son against visiting the grave of his
mother which was situated on the father's property; ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND
WOLFF 1446, n.45 (citing further decisions).
69. On the other hand, contrary to French doctrine and practice, the
German doctrine of the abuse of rights excludes the procedural rights (the
French voies de recours) from the domain of abuse of rights. Cf. note 23,
supra. In the leading opinion of the German Supreme Court, Judgment of
February 10, 1940, 162 RGZ 65 (1940) all actions carried out under the rules
of civil procedure are governed exclusively by the rules of procedure; hence
their validity is to be determined by other principles than those which are
laid down in the Civil Code, cf. SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 989 (4).
69a. Thus, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Miinster held the State
Rheinland-Westfalen liable for abuse of rights for the violation of the Law on
the Protection of Mothers when notice of dismissal to an employee was given
one month before the birth of her child. The State argued that the Law was not
applicable to her case; cf. Judgment of July 11, 1951, 30 DEUTSCHE RICHTER-
ZEITUNG (Heft 1, 1952).
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morals provisions; in these cases, however, the judgment is
not based on abuse of rights alone but equally on the parties'
behavior that violated the moral standards set by articles 242
and 826.70
In the standing jurisprudence of the German courts, arti-
cle 226 is treated restrictively; 71 indeed, the general attitude
of the courts is to deny relief in situations which involve
merely allegations of abuse of rights.7 2 The dominant concern
is the equitable compromise of conflicting interests and the
consideration of those specific social functions which should
be assured by the regular exercise of rights; hence the courts
invalidate merely the results of such actions on grounds of
abuse which are contrary to the social purposes and goals
inherent in these rights. 73
With respect to the influence of the principles established
by the theory of the "internal" abuse of rights, controversies
involving business partnerships offer good illustration. In a
case which involved the striking from the commercial register
of a limited liability company, on the grounds that its regis-
tration as such constituted an abuse of rights under the perti-
nent sections of the commercial laws because the company
was essentially a one-man corporation, the court rejected the
request. It held that the purpose of the law was to create a
legal entity through commercial registration, and this pur-
pose has been achieved. The court went on to state that the
subsequent transfer of the shares to one owner did not de-
stroy the legal entity, and even though such transfers are not
altogether justifiable in theory they are harmless to the
economy and indeed quite necessary in practice. Since the
purpose of the law was not violated through the registration,
the legal entity thereby created should be recognized. 74
The same principle was followed by the court in holding
70. SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 986.
71. For an early decision, cf. Judgment of February 3, 1915, 86 RGZ 191
(1915); SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 986.
72. Judgment of July 13, 1954, 14 BGHZ 294 (1954) (not considered as
abuse of rights if members of an undertakers' trade union were denied access
to burial grounds which belong to a Church); DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG
643 (1936) (invalidation of easements where the owner of the land had other
means of entry); cf. also SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 990; further decisions in Com-
ment on refusals to recognize abuse of rights, 8 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 373
(1953).
73. SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 989.
74. Judgment of October 9, 1956, 21 BGHZ 378 (1956); similar reasoning in
Judgment of July 12, 1956, 21 BGHZ 242 (1956).
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the only member of a limited liability company liable for the
company's debts. 75 The court upheld the validity of the com-
pany since it was registered under the provisions and in ac-
cordance with the principles of the law; however, it went
beyond the text of the law and held that it would violate the
rules of good faith if the purpose of the law-in this case the
reliance on the separation of the company's assets from those
of its members-is abused. The court referred to a prior deci-
sion 76 which stated that no legal entity should be given rec-
ognition if used contrary to the purposes of the law.
By similar reasoning, the court refused to permit the
transfer of a company's assets from West Germany to East
Germany, 77 and held that such measures of uncompensated
expropriation would be contrary to the legal nature and the
social purposes of a legal entity. Added reasons for refusal
were the possible extraterritorial effects that would be in-
volved in the transfer.
In other decisions, the court qualified the following ac-
tions as abuses of rights: a father's eviction of his son-under
the provisions of the Law on Homesteads-from the farm on
which the son had worked for many years;78 a father's
refusal-under the rules on parental rights-to the marriage
of his daughter on the ground that the future husband had a
different religion;7 9 while in another case it was held as a
violation of good faith if the defense of an arbitral award is
brought up in judicial proceedings.8 0
SWITZERLAND
The treatment of the Swiss developments in the field of
abuse of rights was left to the last, not because of the al-
phabetical sequence of the countries discussed, but because of
the excellent synthesis offered by the Swiss jurisdiction of
the implementation of this doctrine.
Even though Swiss legal science and practice are much
influenced by German and French law-for instance, Swiss
75. Judgment of November 29, 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1957).
76. 169 RGZ 248 (1943).
77. Judgment of January 30, 1956, 20 BGHZ 4 (1956).
78. Judgment of March 15, 1967, 47 BGHZ 184 (1967).
79. Judgment of September 25, 1956, 21 BGHZ 340 (1956).
80. Judgment of May 20, 1968, 50 BGHZ 191 (1969). In this instance the
court discussed the rules on estoppel by conduct if it violates the accepted
principles of good faith.
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courts frequently cite German decisions in support of their
judgments,"' and Swiss legal scholars consult German and
French theories in the elaboration of their views-Swiss law
naturally possesses its own unique national characteristics
which are equally evident in the implementation of the doctrine
of the abuse of rights.
The most outstanding of these is the famous article 1 of
the Swiss Civil Code which, as an unprecedented measure,
gives quasi-legislative functions to the courts by authorizing
the judges to substitute their own interpretation where the
text of the law or the accepted custom is silent or inadequate.
In addition, article 1 states that in the execution of this
function the judge should act as though he were the legis-
lator.82 The next article contains the rule on abuse of rights.83
In line with the spirit of article 1, this provision contains
equally the authorization of the judge to apply the law in
accordance with his own interpretation; this authorization is
implicit in the structure as well as in the wording of the text.
In structure, the article is built around the provision on good
81. See, e.g., BGE 69.2.102, 103-4 (1943). This influence, of course, is
mutual, and frequently the consequence of personal relations between the
scholars of the three countries. Examples are found in the EUGEN HUBER
ARCHIV with respect to the preliminary drafts of the SwISS CIVIL CODE; for
instance, Rudolf Stammler made a few suggestions to Huber on the formula-
tion of the introductory provisions of the Code. Cf. Merz, Annotations to
Article 2, Swiss Civil Code, in 1 LIvER, MEYER, HAYOZ, MERZ, JAGGI,
HUBER, FRIEDRICH AND KUMMER, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH, Ein-
leitung, Artikel 1-10, 213 et seq., at 229 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH].
Abbreviations for Swiss reports are the following: BGE: ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTES (reports of the de-
cisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court).
82. The text of article 1 reads in the official French version: (1) La loi
rdgit toutes lee matibres auxquelles se rapportent la lettre ou l'esprit de l'une
de sea dispositions. (2) A dfaut d'une disposition lgale applicable, le juge
prononce selon le droit coutumier et, ba d~faut d'une coutume, selon lee regles
qu'il 6tablirait s'il avait h faire acte de lsgislateur. (3) Il s'inspire des solutions
consacr~es par la doctrine et la jurisprudence. See the excellent annotated
French edition of the CIVIL CODE AND THE CODE OF OBLIGATIONS (Scyboz-
Gillibron, eds. 1972). In the following, the citations from the Civil Code will be
made from this edition and not from the equally authentic German text. For
details on Article 1, see 1 A. EGGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
ZIVILGESETZBUCH, Einleitung, Arts. 1-10, 43 (2d ed. 1930) [hereinafter cited
as EGGER].
83. The text of the SwISS CIVIL CODE art. 2 reads: (1) Chacun est tenu
d'exercer see droits et d'exzcuter ses obligations selon lee rgles de la bonne foi.
(2) L'abus manifeste d'un droit n'est pas prot~gd par la loi.
1975] 1031
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
faith to which the prohibition of the abuse of rights is at-
tached; however, with the qualification-which is absent in
the French and German laws-that the abuse be manifest.84
The combined structure and the wording point to the neces-
sity of judicial interpretation; since the constitutive elements
of abuse are violations of good faith and the manifest abusive
exercise of rights, neither of these elements may be deter-
mined otherwise than by judicial interpretation.
Furthermore, the Swiss legislator had no scruples in plac-
ing the prohibition of the abuse of rights among the general
provisions in the introductory part of the code. Neither does
it seem that the doubts voiced by the French and the German
legislators on the positive codification of a theory that in-
volves the abuse of a right the very exercise of which would
preclude abuse, were shared by the Swiss legislator. True, in
the original draft, the abuse provision referred only to the
right of ownership if maliciously exercised, but in the follow-
ing drafts it was extended to every right the exercise of which
is motivated by a legal interest. In the final formulation-the
achievement of Eugen Huber who was the reporter, the
draftsman and the moving spirit behind the code85-the pro-
hibition became a succinct statement to the effect that any
manifest abuse of rights will be refused legal protection.
Article 2 goes beyond the French and the German laws in
two respects. First, it is not merely directed towards the
debtor as are the German and French provisions, but places
also the exercise of rights by the creditor as well as the
performance of the debtor under the requirements of good
faith.86 Second, the implicit necessity of judicial interpreta-
tion does not make the determination of abuse contingent
upon the allegation of the parties; on the contrary, by raising
it into a question of both law and fact, the determination of
abuse becomes the duty of the courts.87
These principles expressed in article 2 justify the standing
practice of the Swiss courts in the interpretation of abuse of
84. The French expression is manifeste, the German expression is offen-
bar. See BGE 88.2.18, 24 (1962).
85. On the history of the codification of the SwISS CIVIL CODE, see P.
LIVER, Einleitung, in SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH 1. On Professor
Huber's work on the Code, see id. at 31.
86. MERZ, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZVILGESETZBUCH at 230; EGGER, Arts.
1-10, 72 et seq., with comparative notes to the French and German laws.
87. See the opinion of the Supreme Court in BGE 88.2.23 (1962); also BGE
72.2.39, 44 (1946); P. TUOR, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILGESETZBUCH 48 (8th
ed. by B. Schnyder & P. Jiiggi 1968).
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rights; indeed, it is merely a codified formulation of a long line of
decisions handed down by the Federal Supreme Court long
before the civil code came into force.8 8
With respect to the general application of article 2, it
should be recalled that it is set down among the ten introduc-
tory articles of the code and as such it is of the nature of a
general rule. Hence its application is not restricted to one
certain area of the law but cuts through all those areas in
which rights may be subject to abuse: for instance, in family
law, or in the laws of contracts, civil liability, unfair competi-
tion, and even in the area of public law. 9 Similarly to French
law, but contrary to German law, the laws of procedure fall
equally under the abuse of rights prohibition; since these are
construed as part of the individual freedom to bring actions,
like all freedoms, it may also be abused.
Nevertheless, in spite of the broad field given to the appli-
cation of article 2, Swiss practice developed certain uniform
principles under which the courts may hold the exercise of
rights contrary to the purpose of the law, and therefore abu-
sive. These principles are mostly applied in situations which
show:
(a) a useless or unprofitable exercise of rights;
(b) a gross disparity of interests;
(c) no consideration for the rights of others in the exercise
of rights;90
(d) controversial behavior, or estoppel through conduct
(the venire contra factum proprium rule) with two most fre-
quently arising situations involving the defense of the limita-
tion of actions and the claim to void transactions on grounds
of failure of form (the latter claim is always deemed inadmis-
sible); and finally,
(e) in actions involving unfair competition.9 1
88. EGGER at 72, citing BGE 32.2.360, 365 (1906), the case involved a
situation of unfair competition. See also 0. A. GERMANN, GRUNDLAGEN DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 50 (2d ed. 1968).
89. E.g., abuse of rights was alleged against a decree of the Conseil
d']ktat of the Canton of Geneva in which the demolition of private apartment
houses or smaller dwellings was enjoined for reasons of scarcity of private
habitations; cf. BGE 89.1.430 (1963). See also an earlier decision in BGE
47.2.452 (1917).
90. The untranslatable German expression is "schonende Rechts-
ausiibung," and arises mostly in connection with actions of nuisance
between neighboring lands or buildings.
91. Compare SCHWEIZERISCHES ZVILGESETZBUCH at 37 (no. 39), 243 with
German text at notes 65-68, supra.
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Before listing a few examples of the treatment given by
Swiss courts to abuses of rights one of the leading opinions of
the Federal Supreme Court might serve as a good illustra-
tion:92
For over a long period the Swiss courts recognize in
article 2 C.C. the 'positive limits of all exercise of rights.'93
The fundamental theory of this article is the recognition
that positive legislation is unable to affect in detail all the
controversies which may arise in the society of men, and
it is equally impossible for it to regulate these controver-
sies in advance. However much the legislator may try to
build up a legal structure that shows no gaps in the laws,
there will always be special cases in which a rigid applica-
tion of the statutory principles would lead to injustice,
and this the judge is not permitted to tolerate. This hap-
pens in particular if individual rights are exercised con-
trary to good faith. Section 2 of article 2, which denies
legal protection to the manifest abuse of a right, forms
the necessary amendment to the duty which is set down
in section 1 of article 2, namely, to act always in good
faith. The purpose of this provision is to either limit or to
annul the formal validity of positive laws whenever the
judge deems this to be in the interests of substantive
justice. Hence the application of article 2 should cover the
whole area of the civil code as well as that of the code of
obligations. This follows from the article's position in the
code and is also in conformity with its usual description as
exceptio doli generalis.94
Nevertheless, the courts employ great caution in qualify-
ing actions as abusive exercises of rights, even if it is alleged
that they are contrary to the purposes of the law. Thus, for
instance, in certain transactions for which either the law or
the contracting parties require the strict adherence to cer-
tain forms, the courts refer to the interests of legal certainty
and security in their refusal to apply article 2, and set aside
the parties' arguments to the effect that the exercise of
rights based on these very forms is contrary to the purposes
of the law.9 5
92. BGE 72.2.39 (1946).
93. The court refers here to BGE 47.2.453 (1917).
94. BGE 72.2.39 (1946) (translation by author).
95. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH at 242. The example mentioned
is insistence on the legally prescribed written form in contractual transac-
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In the following, a few decisions are listed to illustrate
the application of article 2 by the Swiss Supreme Court.
With respect to defects of form, the courts refused to
invalidate transactions under application of article 2 if plain-
tiff himself was responsible for the defect (in the instant case,
the witnessing of the contract by one of his employees);9 6 or if
the required official registration of the transaction was either
incomplete 97 or inaccurate as to price,9 8 or even negligently
omitted.9 9 On the other hand, it found manifest abuse of
rights in the claim for the invalidation of a contract for the
sale of land when plaintiff knowingly registered a lower price
than actually agreed upon by the parties. 0 0
In further decisions involving the application of article 2
on grounds of the running of the limitations of actions
(liberative prescription), the court upheld the claim of a vil-
lage community against the relatives of one of their welfare
clients, since they fraudulently made it impossible for the
community to bring their action within the required time
limit;1° 1 similarly, the court upheld the claim of a son against
his father who was manifestly malicious in giving the son to
understand that their contract for the sale of land against
the father's annuity was valid after the limitation of registra-
tion had run. 0 2 The court found manifest abuse of rights in
both cases and applied article 2.
On the other hand, the court found no manifest abuse
and no violations of good faith in cases which involved the
rights of heirs to check the records of a family foundation in
an endeavor to ascertain their claims to the succession;10 3 or
the right of a wife to inherit under the stipulations of a
marriage contract that did not withhold fraudulently the
statutory shares of the heirs; 0 4 furthermore, there was no
abuse of rights in the refusal to alter the provisions of a.
long-term contract requested in view of changed cir-
tions, which must be upheld even though the parties-in the instant case, a
lawyer and a businessman, respectively-do not require the protection of the
written form. Cf. also BGE 53.2.162, 166 (1927).
96. BGE 72.2.39 (1946).
97. BGE 86.2.256 (1960).
98. BGE 92.2.323 (1966).
99. BGE 88.2.19 (1962).
100. BGE 92.2.323 (1966).
101. BGE 76.2.113 (1950).
102. BGE 89.2.256 (1963).
103. BGE 92.2.365 (1964).
104. BGE 82.2.477 (1956).
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cumstances; 0 5 and there was no manifest abuse of rights
(affecting freedom of employment) in the absence of bad faith
when an employer hired a foreign worker without requiring
the showing of a working permit and thereby violating the
police rules. 0 6
With respect to violations of the principles of good faith
and hence a manifest abuse of rights, the court held article 2
applicable if a legal institution is used for a purpose that is
contrary to its original aims; 0 7 if the member of an associa-
tion is excluded from the association, especially if the exclu-
sion is not motivated by the interests of the association;' 0 8
but held that the decisions of the general assembly of a busi-
ness corporation (socit anonyme) constitute a manifest
abuse of rights only if they are obviously against the in-
terests of the minority, and there is no particular reason to
support the interests of the majority. 09
It is hoped that the above brief survey of the implemen-
tation of the abuse of rights doctrine in three important
Western jurisdictions ha4 demonstrated the essential merits
of the doctrine: the rejection of a rigid adherence to the letter
of the law in the evaluation of individual action in the exer-
cise of rights granted under law, and in particular of such
exercise as is carried out within the letter of the law but is
contrary to the principles of good faith and to the social
purposes and functions of the law.
105. BGE 47.2.440 (1921). This decision is a masterful application of all
the principles of judicial interpretation. The case involved a request for
rescission of a contract on grounds of price increases occasioned through the
conditions of World War I. The court went into every circumstance of the
case, including the difference in profit margins over the years, before reject-
ing the request.
106. BGE 84.2.424 (1958).
107. BGE 86.2.417 (1961),Journal des Tribunaux 325 (1961); BGE 94.1.659,
Journal des Tribunaux 216 (1970).
108. BGE 85.2.525 (1965), Journal des Tribunaux 538 (1960); BGE 90.2.346,
Journal des Tribunaux 258 (1965).
109. BGE 95.2.157 (1970), Journal des Tribunaux 344 (1970). The decisions
listed in notes 105-107 were taken from the French annotated edition of the
SwIss CIVIL CODE which contains a wealth of references to cases decided
under each article.
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